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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 06-2704
________________
ANTONIO GEATTI,
               Appellant
   v.
AT&T
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civ. No. 03-cv-05826)
District Judge: Honorable William H. Walls
_______________________________________
Submitted For Possible Dismissal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
Before:       MCKEE, FUENTES AND ROTH, CIRCUIT JUDGES
(Filed:  April 16, 2007)
_______________________
 OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
Antonio Geatti, proceeding pro se, appeals the District Court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of Appellee and its denial of his motion for reconsideration.  For the
reasons set forth below, we will dismiss this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
     1Appellee filed a motion to dismiss for lack of appellate jurisdiction, arguing that
Appellant’s notice of appeal was untimely filed, and that this Court therefore lacked
jurisdiction to hear the appeal.  The District Court’s opinion granting Appellee’s motion
for summary judgment was entered on January 24, 2006.  However, it was not
accompanied by a separate document setting forth the judgment as required by Rule
58(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  As such, judgment was not entered until
June 23, 2006.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(b)(2)(B); Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(7)(ii).  Because
Appellant’s notice of appeal was filed prior to that date, his appeal was timely.  See Fed.
R. App. P. 4(a)(2).  Accordingly, Appellee’s motion is denied.
2
1915(e)(2)(B).
Geatti filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey in December 2003, alleging that he was discriminated and retaliated against and
harassed by his former employer, AT&T, based on his race and national origin.  His
complaint was based on the fact that on January 18, 2002, he received notice that his
position was being eliminated as part of a reduction in workforce.  Because we write
primarily for the parties and because the details of Appellant’s employment history and
the reduction in workforce are set out in the District Court’s opinion, we do not discuss
them in detail here.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.1  The District
Court entered summary judgment in favor of Appellee.  We review a district court’s grant
of summary judgment de novo.  Pennsylvania Coal Ass’n v. Babbitt, 63 F.3d 231, 235
(3d Cir. 1995).  Summary judgment is proper only if it appears “that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Carrasca v. Pomeroy, 313 F.3d 828, 832-33 (3d Cir.
32002).  To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must set forth
specific facts showing a genuine material issue for trial and may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of its pleadings.  Connors v. Fawn Mining Corp., 30 F.3d 483, 489
(3d Cir. 1994).
Because Geatti has been granted in forma pauperis status pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915, we review this appeal for possible dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 
An appeal may be dismissed if it has no arguable basis in law or fact.  Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). 
First, Appellant claimed that his position, rather than one of the two other
comparable positions in his department, was eliminated based on his race and national
origin.  While Appellee argued that neither of the individuals in the two other positions
were similarly situated to Appellant, the District Court concluded that Appellant had
made out a prima facie case of discrimination and that Appellee had advanced a
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for eliminating Appellant’s position.  See Marzano v.
Computer Scis. Corp., 91 F.3d 497, 502-04 (3d Cir. 1996).  The District Court then
moved to the third step of the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework, see
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973), and concluded that
Appellant had failed to proffer any evidence from which a factfinder could reasonably
conclude that Appellee’s articulated justification was a fabrication or that “discrimination
was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the adverse employment
action.”  Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994).  We agree with this
     2As the District Court explained, Appellant never articulated which position AT&T
failed to promote him to.  Because he did mention a position vacated by Michael Conrad
in his EEOC complaint, both AT&T and the District Court assumed that this was the
position he was referring to.
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analysis, and therefore conclude that the District Court correctly entered summary
judgment in favor of Appellee on this claim.
With respect to Appellant’s claim of discrimination based on AT&T’s failure to
promote him, we conclude that, assuming he was referring to the position filled by
Michael Conrad,2 the District Court properly held that Appellant failed to demonstrate
that he was qualified for that position.  See id. at 763.  To the extent Appellant’s
complaint was based on AT&T’s failure to promote him to the position vacated by
Conrad, as the District Court explained, this position was eliminated with Conrad’s
promotion, and therefore, there was no position for appellant to be promoted to.
As to Appellant’s failure to hire claim, we agree with the District Court that, for
those positions for which Appellant was qualified, and which remained open and were
eventually filled, while Appellant did make out a prima facie case, Appellee nonetheless
demonstrated that Appellant was not hired for those positions for legitimate non-
discriminatory reasons.  See id.  Because the burden then shifted to Appellant to show by
a preponderance of the evidence that Appellee’s explanation was pretextual, and because
Appellant set forth no evidence of pretext, we agree with the District Court that Appellant
failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to this claim.  See id.
Finally, Appellant alleges that, between January 2002, when he received notice
5that his position was being eliminated, and March 2002, when he was ultimately
terminated, he was harassed and retaliated against by his manager and the Director of
Human Resources.  We agree that Appellant has not established a prima facie claim of
harassment based on race or national origin.  See Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp.,
85 F.3d 1074, 1081 (3d Cir. 1996).  With respect to his claim of retaliation, we agree that
Appellant’s claim must fail as the adverse employment action in question – the
elimination of Appellant’s position – had already been decided upon prior to Appellant’s
complaints.  See Slagle v. County of Clarion, 435 F.3d 262, 265 (3d Cir. 2006). 
Furthermore, to the extent Appellant claims that he was not hired for any other positions
in retaliation for his complaints to upper management, we conclude that Appellant has
failed to demonstrate the required causal connection, as Appellee has already
demonstrated that Appellant was not the most qualified candidate for any of the other
positions he applied for.  See id.
For the reasons stated above, we conclude that the District Court correctly entered
summary judgment in favor of Appellee on all claims.
Following the District Court’s entry of summary judgment, Appellant sought
reconsideration pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing
that the District Court had overlooked certain relevant material facts in reaching its
decision.  Appellant’s disagreement with the outcome of the District Court’s opinion is
not the proper basis for a motion for reconsideration.  See Max’s Seafood Café ex rel.
Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999).  Because Appellant set
6forth no basis upon which such a motion could be granted, we conclude that the District
Court correctly denied Appellant’s motion. 
Accordingly, we conclude that this appeal lacks legal merit, and will therefore
dismiss it pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).  Appellant’s motion for appointment of
counsel is denied.
